

China Landpower Studies Center
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DIALOGUES

EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

LTG Xavier T. Brunson, Retired MAJGEN Mick Ryan, and COL Rich Butler New Technologies and Emerging Trends in the Indo-Pacific

In this episode of CLSC Dialogues: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific, Lieutenant General Xavier T. Brunson, the commanding general of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, retired Major General Mick Ryan of the Australian Army, and Colonel Rich Butler, director of the China Landpower Studies Center, discuss new technologies and emerging trends in the Indo-Pacific.

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I'm here with Lieutenant General Xavier T. Brunson, the commanding general of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord. With us is Colonel Rich Butler, director of the China Land Power Studies Center. Joining us from Australia is Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army and a nonresident fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia.

Today's topic is new technology and emerging trends. Colonel Butler, the floor is yours, sir.

Colonel Rich Butler

Good afternoon, General Brunson and General Ryan. It's really great to have you on the podcast today. You're dealing with an awful lot of issues with your experience, General Ryan, as a troop commander and thought leader for the Australian Army and its military, and General Brunson, [with] all the work that you're doing out at I Corps as you enter your final year in command, I think, at this point.

As the leader of an Army Corps, as you are right now, or, General Ryan, with your leadership experience regionally aligned in the Indo-Pacific and focused on the Indo-Pacific, what trends do you think about regarding the evolving nature of conflict, specifically in that region?

Lieutenant General Xavier T. Brunson

The most important thing that I think that you said is "thought leader." That he is a thought leader. And what I'm finding as we look at the problems—the challenges, rather—that exist in the Indo-Pacific region, **whether that be the tyranny of distance or whether that be our posture in the region or whether it be our thoughts on protection or sustainment in the region, all those challenges require deeper thought.** There are no forgone conclusions as it relates to conflict in the Indo-Pacific. So, I think the way that we think about solving problems in the region is one of the chief things that I would talk about, not necessarily the nature of war, not necessarily the character of a war

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that might occur there, but the need for professionals to give themselves over to thought about the challenges that face us in the future.

Assuming funding and baselines and budgets stay flat—no increase, no decrease—it causes us to take a view of this current conflict or the current, let's say, competition that's going on in the region from the perspective of, we are where we are, our treaty allies are who they are, our friends and partners in the region are who they are, and they only have so much to give. And how do we achieve posture? How do we achieve sustainment? How do we achieve protection with all those things being said, and we have what we have?

And I think that until we start giving ourselves over to thinking about how we would solve the problems and challenges in the region, then nothing else really matters. And if we give ourselves over to thought on those challenges, those particular challenges that only exist in the Pacific, I think we start to see things a little bit differently.

So, where I challenge my staff as the commander of a corps is, "How might we solve things differently?"—and not saying that we want to break away from what our doctrine says [and] not saying that we need to make wholesale changes or sweeping changes in the way that we apply combat power to solve challenges—but what are the instruments of national power [that] are out there that we might be able to leverage in order to achieve an effect?

There have been four articles pushed out of this corps recently by staff officers in the corps. This notion of the three kings of the Pacific—we've had an article written on each of those three kings. We're now trying to write a capstone article, if you will, for publication. It's protection, it's posture, it's sustainment. It's taking best advantage of what our partners can do, as opposed to trying to make them in our image, but to appreciate where they are. There is posture in the region because we have friends, partners, and allies there, and we have to take best advantage of that.

And I'll stop there. Over to you, General Ryan, sir.

Major General Mick Ryan

Well, thanks, General. I totally agree with everything you just said, and I look forward to reading those papers, in particular because I think they'll be important and influential in a few different countries in the region.

When I look at the Indo-Pacific, you know, I see the convergence of three important trends that are changing how we're going to have to fight. And I see a few continuities. So, now the big three changes—I call them the "transformative trinities"—the first one is the increasing mesh of civilian and military sensor systems, which provides a greater degree of transparency of the entirety of the battlespace from tactical to strategic dimensions in a way that we haven't seen before. It means you will be seen. Now, whether that confers wisdom on who's seeing you is a very different question. So, I think that's the important trend we're seeing, and the bar is lower for meshing those systems together than it's ever been. The second trend is the democratization of digital command and control. It means just about everyone in the battlespace now has access to what used to be high-level classified information on blue and red situations and intelligence reports. And the third trend is this trend in uncrewed systems (whether they're autonomous, semiautonomous, or remotely controlled) across all the domains, not just in the air. I mean, the air is simple for some uncrewed systems. Maritime and grand environments are much more difficult, but we're seeing them proliferate and they're going to be very, very important in the Indo-Pacific.

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But when you bring those three trends together, you have a transformation in both tactical and operational-level warfare and also how countries support them. So, they're the big, I think, changes that are going to change the face of warfare in the Indo-Pacific. It will change things like massing and dispersion. It will change things [like] how you work allies.

So, what's the same? I think the most important thing that we have to remember is [that] will is still vital, whether it's political will to deter countries like China, whether it's the political will to go through the process of mobilizing a country for that and to fight a war if necessary, and the will of the people to sustain long-term protracted operations, which is one of the themes of the China [Landpower] Studies Center. I think that is very important.

And the other one is resilience—resilience in all its dimensions. [It] could be cyber resilience, [it] could be resilience of our space-based systems, or it could be the resilience of the extraordinarily long supply lines from the West Coast of the United States out to the Western Pacific. I mean, Europe has nothing like this. This is a very, very unique challenge. I just say that, you know, that there's those three big changes I think that we're going to have to take account of. There's those things that are continuities. And I do think we do need to do some work on the warfighting concepts that solve these really profound problems that we're likely to face in the Indo-Pacific.

Butler

Before we change topics, General Brunson, you've been very articulate on how we need to think about [command and control, or] C2 differently. From the vantage of what General Ryan just talked about in terms of how everything speeds up and you're going to be a lot more autonomous, how does C2 and making decisions play [into] how you think about operating in the Indo-Pacific?

Brunson

I would like to answer that by first pointing back to that transformative trinity that General Ryan mentioned. What that really gets at for us is this notion of sanctuary. Heretofore, we've had great sanctuary. We've not been observed. We've been able to move freely. And the points that he makes there all look at the fact that—very cheaply—we can be observed. One only has to casually review the news from Jordan recently or look at things that have gone on at Al-Asad Airbase to recognize that for very little dollars, very little currency, very few resources, we can be observed, we can be impacted, we can be degraded, denied, and even dissuaded from ensuring the will of our people is met. And [General Ryan] spoke on will, as well. So, I think that what that causes us to do is recognize that sanctuary is, at best, relative now. It's relative to the conditions that you can create at a specific place in time. Much like we think about convergence bringing all the assets across domains to bear at a single focus point in time, we have to do the same thing with sanctuary, I think.

One way we deal with that is the physical nature of how we organize ourselves. I've never said that there [does] not need to be a main command post, a port area command post, and [tactical action center, or] TAC. I've never said that. What I've said is those are functions that occur in those places that ought to be dispersed. And the way we found to do that within this corps is through distributed command-and-control nodes. That's a recognition that if I'm smaller, and I can exist below the noise of a place, if my signals don't give me away or leave me prone to observation, then I can do the things necessary to prosecute a campaign, a battle, a fight, an engagement. I can

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do all those things by recognizing that I'll have to utilize some reach-back because I can't come into the region in large form, or mass, as I might have at one point in time, and that a peer competitor requires a bit of respect of their capabilities and knowledge of their capabilities, and then arranging myself in time and space in such a way that I can accomplish the objective set before me while also not putting myself at greater risk as we arrange ourselves.

The clearest example we had recently was going down to Talisman Sabre in Australia. We placed one of our nodes, a logistics node, in Guam. We placed a node in the northern part of Australia. And when you started to talk about scale, it was the best opportunity that we had. We were also down in Brisbane [Australia] with another node. And I got up one day and said, "Hey, I'm just gonna go from up here at this base. I'm gonna drive down from the training area to Brisbane."

[The staff] go, "Boss, you're gonna have to fly."

And I was like, "What?"

And they said, "You don't have the time to get on the road and drive to that place."

I mention that sort of tongue in cheek to say that we—writ large, the world—we in the military, don't really understand the size and scope of the region. So, to that end, what we're doing is we've started this program where we're bringing officers in from other corps within the United States Army to come and look at this problem. And again, we're trying to be good to the things that we're saying. If we say we have to think more deeply about this, then we need more people to be familiar with the region, even if it's only coming out for a Talisman Sabre rotation or a Cobra Gold rotation, just so they can get a better appreciation of it.

But I think that the way that we look at the region is we've got to be in those key nodes, and that's why it's so important in this region, in particular, that we understand the capabilities of our partners and how we might enhance those things and look toward our human and procedural interoperability and arrange ourselves that same way. So, it causes us to do mission analysis more than once—or a larger form of mission analysis that says: 1.) What's the mission that we've been given and what's it going to take to accomplish this? And then, how might we arrange ourselves with this wide tapestry of nations in the region, and what might we be able to do there?

You could call it hubris. You could call it, "Hey, we're the largest and we're in charge." But we can't afford that in this region. And it's this recognition that it will take all of us to accomplish anything within the region, whether that be dealing with environmental concerns in the region, whether that be helping to better understand fishing rights and feeding of people in the region, whether that be understanding long-standing disputes. How you might call something one thing in a country and call it something totally different in another—is it the Philippine Sea, or is it the South China Sea, for example—you know, what are we really talking about?

And I think we've got to be more culturally astute. And I've got to, at these nodes, put people that have an appreciable understanding of the language and culture of the place that we might show ourselves better partners in the region. And I think that, in its truest sense, partnership means there's value on this side [and] there's value on this side, and we've got to bring that together. And in so doing, we help to strengthen the diplomatic pushes that might be happening in all these nations. And we've got to understand that, as well. So, our organization is both physical and it's mental. It's also in the way that we look at who's already there. That, I believe, is posture.

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Ryan

I think the importance of things like staff rides is just vital. I mean, when I did School of Advanced Warfighting with the Marines, we spent three weeks doing a Pacific staff ride from the West Coast of Hawaii to Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and, you know, it was a bunch of Marines on a Navy jet. My roommate was a US Army guy, and it gave you a good appreciation for the distances over which you're going to have to fight into the theater. I mean, you're gonna have to fight into the theater—not just in the theater, I think. And it took the US Navy and US Army and US Marines and US Air Force about 18 months just to get into a position to take Guam.

This is not just a distance problem. It's a time problem, as well. And technology has changed a bit. We're not going to be able to do it the same way, but the operational problems aren't that dissimilar to what we might have faced 80 years ago. But having that knowledge of the ground, having that knowledge of the people, as the General just said, is an essential and nondiscretionary part of solving those problems.

Butler

Can we talk a little bit about the threat in the Indo-Pacific? Noting it is such a vast region and the tyranny of distance and the different types of threats that you face on the military capacities of the [People's Republic of China or] PRC versus the military capacities of the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or] DPRK, a revanchist Russia that still operates in the area, and, frankly, environmental factors and emergencies, can you speak a little about the challenges you're seeing at your level and how we can deal with them more effectively going forward?

Ryan

I think the most obvious challenge is China has a home-game advantage here. Now, the US has been in the region for well over a century, so it knows the region well, but it still doesn't have the same degree of national capacity home based in the region as in China that they do. One of the things that I look at in particular with China and how you take them on is the balance between long-range strike capacity and close combat. And this has both operational and tactical dimensions.

I think we need to be careful not to be treed by a Chihuahua here with the long-range missiles that the Chinese have. Yes, it's significant. Yes, it's capable, but it's not a silver bullet. That alone will not win a war for them. At some point, they need to be able to engage in close combat either in defensive or offensive operations. And I don't think we understand their capacity to do that well enough. And at the same time, America and its allies need to get their balance of long-range versus short-range combat capabilities right. You need to do both, but it's getting the balance of investment, balance between the different forces, and getting the synchronization between it right that will be really important, I think.

Brunson

What I would add is we've not had to deal a lot with disruption. The longer your lines become, the more you can be disrupted. I think we've got to think more about that, as well. General Ryan makes an interesting point. At the end of the day, it's going to come down to the last 100 meters. Either looking at the red or looking at the blue, there's going to be 100 meters that have to be closed with and dealt with. And I think sometimes we fail to give ourselves credit for our ability to bring partners together to achieve an effect.

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If you look across the region, we stand to lose more by not responding, as we have recently in Japan, to an earthquake. If we don't do those things, if we don't show ourselves to be stalwart and able to be counted upon, that'll have a more deleterious effect on our operations than long-range fires will. Everything's a giant if you make everything a giant.

I wrote down what you said, General, because I want to take that into conversations with folks that OK, remember shock and awe? Remember, that was supposed to end [Operation Iraqi Freedom, or] OIF. Go back to Kosovo. Remember we tried to do that from the air? If the United States couldn't win that campaign from the air, then I would say you're not going to win it by lobbing buses into another country. That's not going to happen because, at the end of the day, if your aim is to unite two countries, you're not going to do that short of getting on the ground and fighting that fight.

But I really point to the things that the military can do that are, I would say, less martial. I think there's an importance for those things. It's recognizing the fact that sea levels are rising, that there are natural disasters, and much like we are in competition with the Chinese writ large, they're competing to get into these places as well. You go back to shot diplomacy during the height of COVID [when] we were trying to get vaccines in while the Chinese are getting their vaccine in. We have to continue to demonstrate value. There's got to be a return on the investment for someone to say, "Hey, I want to come to the exercise in the region, and I know the implications of my participation in this exercise because there's a bully in our neighborhood. And when they see us come to your exercise, there are questions that will be asked."

And that's why I think that we have to go a long way toward addressing this threat by not appearing to be transactional in the things that we are doing. And the way that you do that is by proofing the lane, by showing value, by demonstrating value that when there is an earthquake in Japan, we're going to be there—not just because we have forces positioned there, but that's what you have to do to lead.

I was at exercise recently in Japan, so the Germans sent folks there, the French sent people there, the Brits sent people there, our Australian partners in the 1st Australian Division were there. And if there is a division in an army and they send the leadership from that division, what we're saying writ large is this team that stands together is willing to be a buttress against the threats in the region. And it might seem a small thing, but I think it becomes big to our partners when we take the time to send our very best to participate in these exercises because what they really are is rehearsals. And these rehearsals are what's going to ameliorate the threats that exist in the region—our ability to come together and rehearse routinely. And again, it can't be haphazard. It cannot be transactional. It's got to be genuine. We've got to send the right people forward that we might better understand the way threats play out. They're different, and they're not always martial. Sometimes they're economics. Sometimes they're financial, in terms of markets. Sometimes they're political pressures that are placed on nations. I think all those things are ways that we help to deal with the threat, but it starts with our understanding that we can be disrupted and that we will have to operate in a disrupted, denied, and degraded environment in order to accomplish anything in the region.

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Ryan

I think that's a really important point—this trust building and alliance building, long before any potential conflicts. If you go back to World War II or other wars, you know, the US and the Brits and Europe took a long time to learn how to work with each other, whether it was bomber commands or ground forces. It was the same with Australians and Americans in the Second World War. It took us a long time to learn to work with each other. Well, we've got a much, much better standing start. In fact, it's not a standing start for any potential conflict because we know each other. We know each other's doctrine. We know each other's people really well and have developed that over not years but decades. And that is an advantage the Chinese don't have anything like.

But importantly, what it also allows us to do is anticipate not just where we can build strength but where there might be seams and weaknesses that the Chinese might wish to attack with their systems destruction warfare. So, I think this alliance building, this relationship building, partnership building throughout the Indo-Pacific that we're engaged in is one of these critical foundations to deterrence, as well as any potential conflict that might eventuate.

Butler

In the context of dealing with threats and deterring other nations and the work we do with our allies and partners, how open are they to the idea that we're about converging effects as we discuss competition day-to-day versus the tipping into conflict and what that might mean when you have to make really hard decisions about how that coalition that you're building is going to support each other?

Brunson

If I could just throw in one quick point on this. Back to your previous question, General Ryan alluded to it many times already. We've done this before in this region, and we had to fight our way in. We had to fight our way out and then fight our way back in again. So, whether you look at the Korean War or whether you look at operations in the Pacific in the way that we arrange those subunified commands, if you will, in that region, I think that there are numerous lessons in history that if we don't mind these things, we could violate the Hippocratic oath. We will do harm. The Hippocratic oath says do no harm, but we could do significant harm if we don't understand the places we've been before.

Going into Iraq, my dad gave me the US Army's handbook for operations in Iraq. It's a little, small book—maybe 40 pages or so. But the army had been in Iraq before I got there in 2003, and as I read through this thing, I started noticing, wow, they already solved this problem. They solved the problem with scorpions and what to do about the scorpions. They solved the problem with water and how to do desalination. All these things had already been solved for. And I think that we've got to give ourselves the opportunity to read some history and see those same problems because I still see them today.

If I look at commanders like [General Douglas] MacArthur [and] his role in the Philippines and understand that deep history, understand that the Buffalo Soldiers, some of them, went AWOL in the Philippines [and that General Romeo Brawner Jr.], who's the previous Chief of Staff of their [the Philippines'] Army, his great-grandfather was a Buffalo Soldier who fell in love with a Philippine woman and thought, "Life is better for me in the Philippines than it is back

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in America. So, I'm not leaving, Mr. Roosevelt." And he stayed. So, we have historic ties to the region—some good, some bad. But we've got to try to understand those things in history.

Back to your question here. One of the things that I keep thinking about and wrestling with—some of it falls into that transformative trinity that General Ryan spoke about—but it's this thought that any conflict in the region is going to go across all the domains—and we don't have primacy in any of them. And we've got to find ways to maneuver in every domain. And we have to think about it that way. So, sustainment—we have to maneuver to sustain. Heretofore, it's like, "Hey, G4. Get me this gas, now."

Well, we've got to maneuver to get there. We've got to converge. And our partners realize that, too.

But I also think—and we just experimented with this as I talked to General [Ryoji] Takamoto of the Ground Combat Command in Japan—I talked with him about, how about we change the shape of our operating environment by utilizing your fires to help us in this one small area of convergence and not uncover my fires but have ours prepared to do counterfire?

And giving functions of things, that's one thing—taking best advantage of our partners. We don't have to do everything in the air domain. We could possibly use Japanese assets in this instance to use them at the best of their ability. And I think that convergence in our region has to be thought of deeper because, remember, when things kick off, when it goes to cracking, and I believe, personally—this is Xavier Brunson's thought. So, levels of certainty say there are things that I believe, things that I think, and things that I know. What I believe is that there's going to be sympathetic detonation of all the treaties that are in that area. Why? Because those rings that the Chinese can draw from their mainland, they can hold all of our allies at risk. And that's going to cause a sympathetic detonation of these treaties that exist out there. But that's going to also give us the opportunity to take other people's stuff to utilize it in a more Joint and Combined fashion—where the US Navy might not be able to do it, maybe the Philippine Navy can; [or] where the US Navy can't, maybe the Japanese Navy can—to provide us different ways to change the shape of the environment and, thus, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy.

But if we don't account for [these possibilities] in the planning and in the rehearsals of doing these things, we won't be there. And that's a threat that we cause ourselves. That's blue on green, that's green on blue. However you want to look at it, that's us cutting ourselves out [and] committing fratricide on opportunities because whatever conflict comes is going to be built solely on someone's ability to take best advantage of opportunities as they present themselves—whoever can see first, understand first, and act decisively.

I don't think we should have as dour a perspective as we have. And as General Ryan said, we've got friends, partners, and allies in the region. The Chinese do not. And if they miss, that's an opportunity that we've got to seize on. It's going to take everybody. There's this realization now that we can't do this standing alone and unafraid. That's not going to be able to happen because we're playing in a bunch of stadiums in a region that's wide. It's gonna take our ability to think through how we would change the shape of that operating environment that we might take actions.

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Butler

One more question. Let me start with General Ryan on this one because he's written a little bit about five big things you have to do this year to get a little bit better. He's also talked about authoritarian collusion a little bit.

Sir, I'd like to get your thoughts on moving forward, recognizing that the authoritarians are actually communicating and talking and sharing information and equipment with each other a bit more than they did before the Ukraine [War] and what that means for us going forward.

Ryan

Yeah, undoubtedly, we've seen it's not an alliance. It's not some grand access, but it's certainly a group of four countries who are pushing back on Western values, ideas, and predominance in the international, political, and financial system. So, Russia, China, and North Korea and Iran, in a virtual sense, if not in reality, formed an arsenal of authoritarians, which means they have pretty deep magazines and some alignment of ideology. So, that's going to take us solving not just Big Five operational problems, but we've got a big political problem to solve as well. When you look at the Western Pacific, politicians and senior military leaders start from the same point, and they say, "We don't want a war in the Western Pacific." No one in their right mind does. But then we diverge in how we solve that.

Military leaders think, well, we better do everything we can to deter that—build the right military forces, all these kinds of things. Politicians, by and large, go, "I don't want it to happen, but it's not a problem today. Let's kick that can down the road a bit."

And I think there has been a divergence in some respects between the political and military classes in the different countries across the Indo-Pacific in coming together, in converging that unequal dialogue in civil-military relations to present a strong deterrence to Chinese misbehavior in our region, that's really necessary. I do note in the US political system, one of the few areas of convergence is China. Even if there is convergence politically, I think it's going to need more investment. And none of us, I think—except maybe the Japanese—are really investing enough of our GDP in building the quantity [and] the quality of forces, munitions, and alliances that are gonna be needed to stop any Chinese adventurism before a war can begin.

Butler

General Brunson, any reflections on that?

Brunson

General Mick Ryan there, I think he pretty much answered that question.

Butler

Well, gentlemen, I'd like to conclude by offering you the floor if there's anything else you'd like to comment on. I'd like to turn it over to you, starting with General Ryan.

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Ryan

Yeah, thanks. Firstly, it's been a great joy to have another conversation with General Brunson, who has, in my view, a dream job commanding a corps in the Indo-Pacific. I don't imagine any other job where you get up in the morning smiling and looking forward to everything you're doing. So, I deeply envy your current job, and I wish you all the best for it in the future.

I'll just, I think, finish by reemphasizing, again, the importance of Landpower in the Indo-Pacific. We keep seeing all these war games about aircraft carriers and long-range missiles—and all those things are vital. No one's saying that Joint or multidomain operations aren't important. But if you're going to pose a serious challenge to Chinese aggression, if you're going to force them to really think about how to solve problems, you have to pose a big dilemma on the ground and pose the threat of them losing lots and lots of soldiers. Even for the Chinese, that would be a political difficulty.

So, there's lots of green dots in the Pacific called land. That's where the people are. It's where the politicians are. And if you want to influence both of those, you need to have effective, deployable, survivable, land forces that can engage with the enemy and defeat them.

Butler

Sir, over to you, General Brunson.

Brunson

Thank you. And General Ryan, I will have my book at [Land Forces Pacific] LANPAC, so I can get it signed.

But again, thank you all so much for the opportunity to just talk a little bit about things to come.

Ryan

I'll be honored.

Brunson

I also am reminded of the thing our service Secretary [Christine Wormuth] has said routinely, just to echo General Ryan's points, and that's the importance of Landpower as the linchpin to Joint operations in the Indo-Pacific, that Landpower does have a role. Landpower is intricately woven into our ability to achieve national strategic objectives in the region, and that's going to play a part.

Another thing that I've been thinking about is this need to show, through a mathematical equation, the importance of information in any future conflict. I think that you could take, if you wanted to shorten it, you'd say [large-scale combat operations or] LSCOs in the numerator with information in the denominator. Or you could take every principle of war and place them in the numerator and place information in the denominator. And I think it's the skillful understanding and the ability to maneuver in the information space that's going to make way for our ability to not only counter narratives in the region but also to get our stories out there about what nations are doing together.

And I think that when we do that, we provide time and space for the diplomatic element of national power across the nations to operate in such a way that we mean what we say when we say, "The goal is no war."

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And that's at the heart of what integrated deterrence truly is, and I think that mastering the ability to maneuver in the information space is going to make all the difference in the world. And it might even stop the authoritarian collusion that's going on that we see across the globe, most recently affecting my nation—and all nations, to be quite honest with you—there within Jordan.

I think when people underwrite bad behaviors, it's the express purview of militaries to ensure that we're ready by building partnerships and alliances across the globe that we might maintain peace. And that's the aim of everyone that wears a uniform, or has worn a uniform, is peace.

So, thank you all for the opportunity to speak again. General Ryan, sir, I look forward to seeing you in the near future.

Butler

It's been a great pleasure to have you on board the podcast.

Host

Thank you all for making time for this today.

Ryan

Thanks for the invitation. Great to see you again, General. I look forward to seeing you at LANPAC.

Brunson

Yes, sir. Take care all.

Host

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